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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by the issuance of Writ 
of Certiorari, by this Court on June 12, 1989, and by reliance upon 
Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, as well as 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
This is a criminal matter which began in the Justice of the 
Peace Court of Monticello, appealed first to the Circuit Court, and then 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, where the appeal was dismissed for 
lack of Jurisdiction, (The Court however did not support Monticello's 
position in dismissing the appeal [see Citv of Monticello v. 
Christensen 769 P.2d 853 (Utah App. 1989)]. 
The appeal is here in this Court by grant of Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT Q? ISSUES 
Since the Court has not issued any limitations regarding the 
issues on review the Petitioner believes that the relevant issues on 
appeal are as originally stated in his initial brief, to wit: 
1. Is a "pro se" appellant to be held to the same stringent 
standards as an appellant who is represented by a professional law 
trained individual? 
2. Does a "pro se" appellant have a right to have his appeal 
heard on it's merits, regardless of how inartfully he has argued his 
case in the lower Courts? 
3. Does an accused person have a right to appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, of a criminal matter, under the Utah Constitution 
Article 1 Sec. 12? 
4. Does the State of Utah have to give "full Faith and Credit" to 
the "public acts" of the State of Wyoming, under Article IV Sec. 1 of 
the Constitution of the United States? 
5. Does the State of Utah have the power to suspend a license 
which was validly issued in the State of Wyoming? 
6. Can a person, who has been issued, and has in his possession 
a valid, properly issued license be charged under UC 41-2-28 
"Driving Under Suspension of License"? 
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AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON 
Constitutional Provisions 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I Section 12 
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to * * * appeal in all cases * * *" 
Article VIII Section 3 
"* * * The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction 
over all other matters to be exercised as provided by 
statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary 
for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause.'' 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
Article IV Section 1 
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every of 
Every other State." 
Statutes 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
UC41-2-l(n) 
"License means the privilege to operate a motor vehicle 
over the highways of this state." 
UC 41-2-4 
"(1) A nonresident who is at least sixteen years of age 
and who has in his immediate possession a valid operator's 
license certificate issued to him in his home state or 
country may operate a motor vehicle in this state only as 
an operator.* * *" 
UC 41-2-28 
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"A person whose Operator's License has been suspended 
or revoked as provided by this act, and who drives any 
motor vehicle upon the highways of this State while that 
license is suspended or revoked is guilty of a crime." 
UC 41-17-3 "Driver's License Compact Article 1Kb) 
"'Home state' means the state which has issued and has 
the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or 
permit to operate a motor vehicle" 
(emphasis added) 
UC 41-2-603 (5) "Driver's License Compact 
"The licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction may 
not suspend the privilege of a motorist for whom a report 
has been issued." 
(emphasis added) 
WYOMING STATUTES 
WS 31-9-204 
M
* * * Upon receipt of such certification that the operating 
privilege of a resident of this State has been suspended 
or revoked in any such other state pursuant to a law 
providing for its suspension or revocation for failure to 
provide security for the payment of judgements arising out 
of a motor vehicle accident or for failure to deposit both 
security and proof of financial responsibili ty * * * the 
superintendent shall suspend the license of such resident* 
* * •• 
(This statute was in place when defendant was convicted 
but Wyoming has since enter the Compact and adopted the 
same Statutes as listed above) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a criminal case which was tried originally in the 
Monticello Justice of the Peace Court of Monticello, the Honorable 
Justice Wright presiding, and was tried deNovo in the Twelfth (now 
Seventh) Circuit Court the Honorable Judge Halliday presiding. At 
both Trials defendant/appellant Lee Christensen (hereinafter 
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referred to as Christensen) was found guilty of driving on a 
Suspended License in violation of UCA 41-2-28 although an abstract 
of his valid Wyoming License was in evidence (See Court Record Item 
20 Page 30-31). The case was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals 
and dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction owing to the fact that 
Christensen was unable to provide transcripts of the trial in the 
Circuit Court to establish that he had raised Constitutional issues in 
that Court [(see Monticello v. Christensen 769 P.2d 853 (Utah App. 
1989)]. Writ of Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court on 
June 12, 1989. This case is properly before this Court by the Court's 
own power to grant certiorari to determine the law (See Article VIII 
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution.) 
FACTS 
Christensen would wish to add the following facts (not already 
submitted either in Appellants Brief or in Respondents Brief) to the 
record for the purpose of clarification. 
1. Christensen was issued a license by the state of Utah on 
August 9, 1979, which was made to expire on July 17, 1980. (see 
exhibit B) 
2. Since the date of that expiration Christensen has not 
reapplied for licensing by the state of Utah, but has been 
subsequently licensed by the states of California, Alaska, and 
Wyoming as his residences have changed. 
3. Christensen was issued a license by the state of Wyoming on 
July 17, 1984 (See Exhibit A), which did not expire until July 17, 
1988. 
4. At the time of the accident (October 2, 1986) for which his 
license was allegedly suspended, he presented his Wyoming 
license,(see Exhibit B). 
5. At the time Christensen was arrested for "Driving on 
Suspension" he presented his still valid (see Exhibit A) Wyoming 
Driver's License (see recorded transcript of the trial in Circuit Court 
tape #88SJ008 digital reading 
3302-3140-Testimony of Officer Palmer) 
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SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Christensen did appear "pro se" during all phases of this case, 
contrary to the allegations contained in Monticello's Brief, and is not 
asking for "special treatment" only that the Court view his 
uneducated, inartful arguments, exactly for what they were intended 
to be, a layman's assertion of his constitutional rights, as he 
understands them and is capable of articulating them. 
Christensen did raise the "Full Faith and Credit" argument in 
both the Justice of the Peace and Circuit Courts, and challenged Utah's 
power to suspend his Wyoming license. Because of his inability to 
provide transcripts to the Utah Court of Appeals he was unable to 
establish proof of his prior arguments, especially in light of 
Monticello's insistence that he never raised the issues, therefore his 
appeal was dismissed in that Court. That problem is overcome in this 
appeal by the Court's granting transcripts. 
Utah has no power under the U.S. Constitution to suspend a 
license issued by the state of Wyoming, and if such statutory 
authority was created by statute (which it is not) it would be invalid 
under the Constitution of the United States. 
ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT ONE 
Christensen was not represented by law trained counsel, 
indeed he was not represented at all as evidenced by the fact that he 
at all times spoke, cross-examined witnesses, and argued motions for 
himself.(See recorded transcripts tape 88SJ008 digital reading 2740 
to end and tape 88SJ010 ) No one else spoke for him, although Judge 
Halliday did allow, pursuant to Christensen's motion, a paralegal to 
sit at counsel table, for the limited purpose helping him with 
documents, and staying on point of law. It was clearly understood 
by the Court, through Christensen's motion, and argument that he 
was representing himself. Many lawyers have paralegals, witnesses, 
defendants, and other personnel who sit at counsel table with them 
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for much the same purposes, and yet that never means, or is 
interpreted to mean that those persons are representing the lawyer, 
and cannot be construed as such here. Christensen did in fact appear 
"pro se" 
ARGUMENT TWO 
Christensen did raise the "full Faith and Credit" argument in the 
Circuit, as well as the Justice of the Peace Courts, although he did so 
inartfully, and not in the manner that a law trained individual may 
have done. He did not quote the Article and Section of the U.S. 
Constitution but he did state it clearly enough for all parties to 
understand the essence of the issue, on argument of his motion for 
dismissal (See recorded transcripts tape 88SJ010 digital reading 165-
270) to wit; 
CHRISTENSEN (Arguing motion to the Court) 
"I am a licensed driver in the State of Wyoming and the 
State of Wyoming recognizes that license as it states in the abstract. 
mv status is clear. Because I am being charged with unlawful to 
drive while license is suspended or revoked, that's not the case 
because I do have a license to drive and that license or privilege 
extended bv the state of Wyoming and is recognized in all the states 
of the Union including Utah. * * * The point always comes back to I 
was licensed bv the state of Wyoming and it has to be recognized bv 
the state of Utah* * *there again, as the abstract shows, I have a 
license to drive and I was driving on that license and I don't, I just 
don't see where the law can be applied to me because I'm charged 
with not driving with a license. At the time I had the license in my 
possession and I was authorized to drive and will be so until my 
birthdate. And so I feel this ought to be dismissed because mv 
driving status states that I am licensed bv the state of Wyoming and 
Wyoming recognizes it * * * 
As Christensen did in fact appear "pro se", his failure to exactly 
specify the Constitutional citation he referred to, and the inartful 
method of his argument, should be overlooked by the Court, as the 
issue pressed was clear enough for consideration. In Haines v. 
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Kerner 404 U.S. 519(1971) the Court held that a "pro se's" case 
should be heard on it's merits regardless of it's inartfullness. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
In State v. Muneer 642 P2d 721 (Utah 1982) Justice Durham 
rejected a "pro se's" appeal because; 
" The alleged error relates solely to construction". 
and relied upon the statutory rule in UC 78-3-5 which allowed 
for appeals to the Supreme Court where constitutional issues are 
present. In Munger, no constitutional issues were raised. The 
instant case raises a very distinct constitutional issue, although it is 
not argued with the finesse a lawyer might use. 
Fur thermore , Monticello, in it's Brief relies upon a 
Constitutional, section which was repealed in 1985, and had no 
bearing on a case tried in 1987 (Utah Constitution Article VIII 
Section 9) and the law on such appeals is now governed by statute 
(UCA 77-35-26 (13), while the Utah Supreme Court is given wider 
power to determine any cause through the issuance of writs (Utah 
Constitution Article VIII Section 3) which was in this case 
accomplished by the issuance of the Writ of Certiorari by this Court 
on June 12, 1989, possibly because the Court understood that a 
constitutional issue was being raised, which was a case of first 
impression in the state of Utah. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
Christensen believes that, although he did so inartfully, he did 
raise the Full Faith and Credit argument in both the lower Courts (his 
argument in the Justice Court was a similar argument as is presented 
in the Circuit Court) Monticellos Prosecutor, Mr. Anderson, asserts 
that he would have dismissed the case at an earlier time had he been 
aware of that argument then, yet he is law trained and should be 
much more cognizant of Direct Constitutional quotations, than 
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Christensen, an uneducated construction worker, and should have 
recognized Christensen's statements that his license was issued by 
Wyoming and must be recognized in all of the States including Utah 
as a paraphrase of U.S. Constitution Article IV Section 1. It is after 
ail a prosecutor's ethical duty to seek justice, not solely convictions 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
The state of Utah recognizes that it does not have the power to 
suspend licenses issued by other states in it's definition of 'Home 
state" within the Driver's License Compact, as well as it's various 
instructions on how to handle a violation by a nonresident driver. 
Wyoming before joining the Compact provided a procedure whereby 
a Wyoming resident's license could be suspended for violations in 
another state (WS 31-9-204) which cannot be interpreted as consent 
for another state to suspend it's resident's licenses. 
Further of the cases relied upon by Monticello, only New 
Hampshire v. French. 117 N.H. 785, 378 A.2d 1377 is applicable as in 
that case the defendant was issued a valid license by another state 
before the alleged suspension took place, and in that case the court 
reversed the conviction of Driving on Suspension, although not on the 
Full Faith and Credit issue. Christensen, like French was issued his 
license by Wyoming (in 1984) before the alleged suspension took 
place (1986), and Utah may have taken the proper steps for 
Wyoming to suspend his license, but for some reason did not, 
therefore, no suspension took place because Utah is not empowered 
to suspend the license granted by another state. 
The other cases relied upon by Monticello, Connecticut v. Rov 
23 Conn. Supp, 176 A.2d 66. District of Columbia v. Fred 281 U.S. 49, 
State v. Harkness. 189 Kan. 581, 370 P. 2d 100, State v. Dalton. 13 
Wash. App. 94, 533 P. 2d 864, State v. lustesen. 63 Or. App. 544, 665 
P. 2d 380 , are not applicable as each of them involves a case where 
the defendant's license was suspended in one state, and sought a 
license in the other state while his license was still under suspension 
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in the original state. At trial Christensen introduced the abstract of 
his Wyoming license(see recorded transcripts tape digital number 
3230-3290), which dates were sufficient to prove that his license 
was validly issued prior to the alleged suspension of his license by 
Utah {in 1986) 
ARGUMENT SIX 
Christensen's license from Wyoming was valid at the time of 
his arrest,(as evidenced by his Wyoming license abstract Exhibit A). 
Even the Arresting Officer was aware of it's validity as his testimony 
clear shows (See recorded transcripts tape 88SJ008 digital reading 
3020-3140) in particular where he states the following; 
OFFICER PALMER TESTIMONY 
Officer Palmer: " * * * He produced a Wyoming Driver's 
License and apparently the Wyoming Driver's License was 
valid * * * 
On cross examination by Christensen 
Christensen: "* * * Again as you stated before* * * when you 
asked for my driver's license I gave you a valid Wyoming 
Driver's 
License" 
Officer Palmer: "That is correct." 
* * * 
Christensen: "* * * But you had no indication that my Wyoming 
license had been suspended?" 
Officer Palmer: "That is correct." 
having had testimony and evidence presented showing the 
validity of Christensen's license issued by Wyoming, Monticello 
should have of it's own motion dismissed the case against 
Christensen on the Full Faith and Credit argument. Then this 
"seemingly endless litigation" could have been avoided. Christensen's 
financial resources are not great either, and he is not being paid to 
pursue this appeal either. Mr. Anderson could have saved the City of 
Monticello great expense at the lower Court level. 
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SUMMARY 
It is true that this case should not have been allowed to 
proceed this far. Christensen was validly licensed by Wyoming prior 
to any alleged suspension took place and therefore, to suspend his 
license Utah must go through the State of Wyoming in order to not 
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
Further as a "pro se" Christensen's arguments may not be as 
sophisticated as those of an attorney, but the issue was raised and 
his argument deserves to be heard on it's merits. 
Christensen respectfully urges the Court to reverse his 
conviction and to order the return of his money now in the 
Possession of the Courts, as well as any such other relief as the Court 
deems appropriate. 
Dated this 26th day of August 1989. 
Respectfully submitted 
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rfffiTTFTCATTON OF MAILING 
I certify that four true and correct copies of the copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief was mailed to the opposing counsel by placing 
same in the U.S. Mail first class postage prepaid to the following 
address 
Lyle Anderson 
P. 0. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
on the day of MAO (</r»vj£Uw^i qx Q 
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EXHIBIT A 
D f PAR I Ml N l O f PlJRI IC S'M f IN 
NORMAN H BANGERIEH GOVERNOR JOHN T NIELSEN COMMISSIONE 
D DOUGLAS BODRERO. DEPUTY COMMISSIONE 
L DALE ELTON DEPUTY COMMISSIONE 
October 23, 1987 
Lyo1 Vnderson 
Ci ty At (orney 
P.O. Box 275 
Monti c e l l o , Utah 84535-0275 
He: Lee U Christensen 
In reply, please refer to 
Accident File No. 2-10-636649 
Re: Motor vehicle accident which 
ocv.un<\! on Ocfober 2, 1986 
in or near Salt Lake City 
D.L/File No.: 2155273 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
L<*o II Chris tensen uas issued a Utah Driver License on August 9, 1979 vAich 
was made to expire on July 17, 1980. lie has not renewed his Utah driving 
privilege since that time. However, on October 2, 1986 he was involved as the 
responsible person in an accident. At that time lie showed the officer a 
Wyoning driver license, number 7284199015. 
The accident resulted in substantial damages. On^February 5r 1987 Mr. 
Chrisj/3nsen_wa^ susjiended for one yearjby Financial "Responsibility pursuant to 
the October j^ 1986^ accidents That ^ suspelTsfOTTlrtlT^ enH on February 5, 1988". 
If there are further questions in this matter, please contact this office. 
Respectfully, 
G. Barton Blacks tock 
Bureau Chief 
Records 
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